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COMMENTS
PRIsoNER's CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: SEGREGATED
CONFINEMENT AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971)
Sostre, a prisoner, sued New York correctional officers under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871,1 alleging that his placement in segregated
confinement' was "cruel and unusual punishment." He had been
punitively segregated for writing legal documents for a codefendant
for possessing racially inflammatory writings and for failing to answer
the warden's questions about his membership in a militant group. All
of these violated prison rules, but it is apparent that his racial activism
contributed to the decision to isolate him. In response to his segrega-
tion, Sostre grew increasingly obstinate. He refused to submit to
searches which were a prerequisite to the ordinarily permitted daily
exercise and refused to participate in the required group therapy pro-
gram. Sostre's unwillingness to adhere to the prison rules and regula-
tions precluded his release from segregation for more than a year be-
fore his suit was heard. He was ordered released by the trial court
judge who held first, that the punitive segregation was a dispropor-
tional punishment,3 and second that the conditions were not so
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides remedies at law and
equity for persons whose rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and
laws of the United States are violated by persons acting under color of law.
2. N.Y. CoRR. LAw § 140 (McKinney 1968) authorizes the warden to impose in-
definite segregated confinement until a prisoner is "reduced to submission and obedi-
ence." This comment will not distinguish between "solitary confinement" and "segre-
gated confinement." The courts have used the terms interchangeably. When they
are distinguished in the cases, "solitary" denotes the more severe punishment.
3. The trial court found that there was a violation of three prison rules, but
ruled that the cause of his segregation was the improper personal motives of the
warden, not the conduct of the prisoner. The appellate court focused on the alleged
violations and cited Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) where it
was held that the constitutional permissibility of placing an inmate in segregated con-
finement is to be judged on the reasonable relationship the challenged acts have to
prison security and his punishment, and are not to be measured by the motivation of
the prison officials.
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intolerable as to be unconstitutional per se but were sufficiently severe
that segregation for over fifteen days threatened a prisoner's sanity and
therefore was cruel and unusual punishment. The Second Circuit re-
versed and held: plaintiff's segregated confinement did not violate the
eighth amendment. Indefinite punitive segregation is not unconsti-
tutional per se. Continued violation of a prison rule, represents a
credible threat to prison security and indefinite segregation is a proper
disciplinary response. The surrounding circumstances of Sostre's seg-
regation, although severe, were not so inhuman as to be within the
eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment."4
The eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishment" was taken almost verbatim from the English law designed
to preclude tortuous and barbarous punishments. 5  Originally, the
amendment was read narrowly. Consequently, the case law was
limited.6 In 1910, a majority of the Supreme Court decided that the
eighth amendment's meaning was not static.7 Thus the cruel and
unusual clause could acquire wider scope as "public opinion becomes
enlightened by human justice."" This evolving standard was to be used
to judge "cruel and unusual punishment." The amendment's prohibition
covers three broad areas. First, a punishment is unconstitutional if
it shocks the general conscience or conflicts with fundamental fairness."
Second, punishment disproportionate to the offense committed is un-
constitutional. 0 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Goldberg proposed
4. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
5. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). For an excellent survey of the
history of the eighth amendment, see Comment, The Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause and the Substantive Law, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 635 (1966).
6. The Supreme Court has considered the question of what punishments are in
violation of the eighth amendment only eleven times. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958); Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Badder v. United
States, 240 U.S. 391 (1915); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Howard v.
Flemming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (dissent-
ing opinion); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1878); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475 (1867).
7. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
8. Id. at 378.
9. Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965). See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) ("beneath the dignity of man"); Bums v. Swenson, 430 F.2d
771, 777-78 (8th Cir. 1970) ("of such inhumane and barbaric proportions so as to
shock and offend a court's sensibilities"); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526
(2d Cir. 1967) ("so foul, so inhuman, and so violative of basic concepts of decency").
10. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 3Z3, 339-40 (1892) (dissenting opinion).
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that all punishment should be for a legitimate penal aim and the
punishment cannot go beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim. 1
The courts have recognized the peculiar problems associated with
maintaining discipline in our prison system.' 2 They have been reluc-
tant to intervene in the prison's internal disciplines unless a fundamen-
tal right has been violated by the arbitrary or capricious action of
prison officials.' 3 Therefore, segregated confinement is not unconsti-
tutional per se,'4 but is a legitimate disciplinary measure unless the
11. This third area of proscripted punishment was first announced by J. Gold-
berg, in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890-91 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
Whether it is significantly different from the disproportional test is not clear. There
are conceivable situations where a court might hold a punishment prohibited by the
disproportional test and not by this new test; e.g., cutting off the prisoner's hands may
well serve the legitimate penal aim of preventing pick-pocketing, and yet, clearly
would violate the disproportional punishment rule. Examples of cases which do not fail
the disproportional test while violative of the new test are more numerous; e.g., the
death penalty may not be disproportional to the offense of murder, however, life
imprisonment may be just as effective in serving the penal aim. Several cases were
originally classified within the disproportional test but now appear more appropriately
placed within this third test. See Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir.
1963) (vindictive punishment prohibited); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370
(D.D.C. 1962) (punishment must be reasonably related to the offense). Finally, it
should be noted that it is not clear whether the word "unusual" has any qualitative
meaning different from "cruel." It is clear, however, that distinctions have not been
drawn and thus the courts will not hestitate to find punishment which is "cruel" and
not "unusual" unconstitutional and vice versa. The trend seems to be to hold that
"unusual" adverbially modified "cruel." Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th
Cir. 1969).
12. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388
U.S. 920 (1967); Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185, 1187 (8th Cir. 1965); Hancock v.
Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 791 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F.
Supp. 415, 426 (D. Md. 1966). See also Note, Effect Upon the Constitutional Rights
of those Imprisoned, 8 VILL. L. REv. 379 (1963).
The courts have generally recognized five valid reasons for imposing segregated
confinement on an inmate: (1) where the prisoner is a threat to himself or to
others, Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 n.15 (2d Cir. 1967); Graham v.
Willingham, 384 F.2d 367, 368 (10th Cir. 1967); (2) where the prisoner destroys the
furniture in his cell, Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir. 1969); (3)
where the prisoner has made a bona fide escape threat, Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp.
497, 500 (S.D. Ga. 1970); (4) where the prisoner has disobeyed a valid prison rule or
order, Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523, 527 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Fulwood v.
Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962); (5) where the prisoner causes an
increased likelihood of rebellion, Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C.
1962).
13. Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367, 368 (10th Cir. 1967); see also Com-
ment, 23 ALA. L. REV. 143, 147 (1970).
14. Bums v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d
349
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conditions are a threat to the prisoner's health' 5 or the length or
quality of the punishment is disproportionate to the offense.
Courts analyzing the conditions of segregated confinement generally
hold that segregation may be harsh and unpleasant,'0 but basic sani-
tation and nutrition is required. 17 Inadequate lighting,"' ventilation,' 0
heating,20 cleaning,2' bedding,22 nutrition,23 medical care,24 or oppor-
1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d
367 (10th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965); Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20
(S.D. Cal. 1964).
15. The following cases in which segregated confinement was adjudged unconsti-
tutional relied at least in part on the conditions of the segregated confinement;
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428
(4th Cir. 1966); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370
(D.D.C. 1962); Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948); Howard v.
State, 28 Ariz. 433, 237 P. 203 (1925). Other cases which held that the conditions
of segregation were not so onerous as to be unconstitutional are as follows: Bums v.
Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Ford v. Board of Managers of New Jersey
State Prisons, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969); Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367
(10th Cir. 1967); Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 920 (1967); Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969); Kostal v.
Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965); Winsby v.
Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Clinton v. Swenson, 320 F. Supp. 595 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Carothers
v. Follete, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.
Ga. 1970); Glenn v. Wilkinson, 309 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Mo. 1970); United States
ex rel Keen v. Mazurkiewicz, 306 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Veals v. Ciccone, 281
F. Supp. 1017 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md.
1966); Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1962); Blythe v. Ellis, 194 F.
Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Myron v. Wainwright, 225 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1969).
16. Ford v. Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prisons, 407 F.2d 937, 940
(3d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel Keen v. Mazurkiewicz, 306 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.
Pa. 1969).
17. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 682 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
18. Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); cI. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370
(D.D.C. 1962).
19. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Fulwood v. Clemmer,
206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
20. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257
F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
21. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F.
Supp. 786 (D. Tenn. 1969). But see Ford v. Board of Managers of New Jersey State
Prisons, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969); Blythe v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex.
1961).
22. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F.
Supp. 786 (D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/8
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tunities to wash 25 are all factors which bear on a finding of cruel and un-
usual punishment. No single condition has ever by itself been held cruel
and unusual; however, the cumulative effect of several conditions will
bring solitary confinement within the prohibition of the eighth amend-
ment. In two recent cases, federal courts considering the constitu-
tionality of segregated conditions looked to the effect of the conditions
of solitary confinement on the mental and emotional balance of the
prisioner. In Wright v. McMann,s6 Judge Kaufman (author of the
Sostre opinion) held that the intolerable conditions of solitary con-
finement at Dannemoa Prison threatened the sanity of a prisoner and
therefore were cruel and unusual. In Fulwood v. Clemmer,2 the court
indicated that the effect of solitary confinement on the mental condition
of the prisoners must be assessed on a case by case basis.
When analyzing the proportionality of the punishment, courts gen-
erally look to the length rather than the conditions of the segregation.28
Long periods of segregation or indefinite segregation will be justified
if a prisoner represents a threat to the lives of other prisoners29 or to
the orderly running of the prison.3 0 However, punishment for a mere
refusal to answer some questionss or the yelling of racial slogans 32
cannot be excessive.
cf. Gordan v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948). Contra, Roberts v. Peper-
sack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966) where for a short period it was permissible.
23. Gordan v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Il1. 1948); Howard v. Smyth,
28 Ariz. 433, 237 P. 203 (1915). Contra, Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1967); Ford v. Board of Managers of New
Jersey State Prisons, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969).
24. Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948). But cf. Courtney v.
Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Blythe v. Ellis,
194 F.2d 139 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
25. Jordon v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Cal. 1966); cf. Wright v. McMann,
387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
But cf. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920
(1967).
26. 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
27. 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
28. See, e.g., Howard v. Smythe, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966); Fulwood v.
Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
29. Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967) (two years of impris-
onment).
30. Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (10 months of imprison-
ment).
31. Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966) (4 years of imprisonment).
32. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) (2 years of impris-
onment).
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In Sostre, the district court's finding that the punishment was dis-
proportionate was overruled, in spite of the unimportance of the rule
violated, on the grounds that the obstinate refusal to obey regulations
was a threat to the order and security of the prison.83 The alternative
holding of the district court was that the conditions of Sostre's con-
finement would threaten a prisoner's sanity if imposed for more than
fifteen days.34 The district court did not rule that these conditions were
absolutely unconstitutional but did hold that subjection to these condi-
tions for over 15 days was absolutely unconstitutional. The majority
overruled this finding. The validity of the Wright principle, that a threat
to the prisoner's mental health is cruel and unusual, went unquestioned.
Yet Judge Kaufman continued consideration of the indefinite period of
segregation to the disproportionality issue; he did not consider the
threat to the prisoner's mental health. The majority opinion noted
the opportunity for exercise and group therapy, which was not accepted
by Sostre but which would have made the confinement endurable, If
the conditions of solitary were endurable, then the court was not going
to abridge the right to utilize solitary confinement by imposing an ab-
solute time limit on the length of the confinement.
There are at least two reasons militating against the court's con-
clusion. First, the mental health of the inmate may be threatened
by the prolonged punitive segregation. This fear has been recognized
by the court's decisions since the 1800's. 35 Just as a restricted diet
may become hazardous to health, and cruel and unusual if it is con-
tinued for long periods,3" solitary confinement may become a threat
33. 442 F.2d at 192-93. Other cases which have held continued segregation permis-
sible so long as the prisoner has not been rehabilitated are: Graham v. Willingham,
384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967); Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523 (C.D. Cal. 1971);
Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970).
34. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
35. An early case noted:
The peculiarities of this system were the complete isolation of the prisoner
from all human society and his confinement in a cell of considerable size, so
arranged that he had no direct intercourse with or sight of any human being
and no employment or instruction .... But experience demonstrated that
there were serious objections to it. A considerable number of prisoners
fell, after even a short confinement into a semi-fatuous condition from
which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently
insane; others still committed suicide. ...
Ex Parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160 at 168 (1889).
36. See cases cited note 23 supra.
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to mental health if continued for an extended period. If it is cruel
and unusual to threaten mental health, then courts will have to ex-
amine the conditions which will make it safe to extend solitary for long
periods or limit the length of solitary to a safe period. The court in
Sostre rejected the latter solution while failing to examine the condition
of Sostre's solitary confinement to see if they could be safely extended
indefinitely. Second, it is generally believed that "[e]xcessively long
periods of punishment defeat treatment goals by embittering and de-
moralizing the inmate."3 7 Prolonged punitive segregation cannot be
justified as being rehabilitative or as being a deterrent when it in-
creases hostility and is therapeutically counterproductive. The only
other possible justification is prison security. Since prolonged solitary
makes the prisoner increasingly hostile, the security of the prison will
be increasingly threatened by the embittered inmate. A more rehabil-
itative method of discipline should be employed so that the inmate
is not more disobedient when released than when he was placed in
solitary confinement. Unfortunately, the court failed to consider
Goldberg's proposed test, whether a legitimate penal aim3 8  was
achieved through the continued segregation of Sostre.
37. THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STAND-
ARDS (1966). It is further stated that punitive segregation should only be used where
-reprimands, loss of privileges, suspended sentences and similar measures" have been
unsuccessful. When used it should be of as short a duration as possible, never
exceeding thirty days. Those inmates who fail to rehabilitate after a short period can
be handled better by different methods of punishment. Finally it is concluded supra
at 413:
(Punitive segregation) is a major disciplinary measure, which can have dam-
aging effect upon some inmates, and should be used judiciously when other
forms of action prove inadequate. . . . (It) may bring short term conform-
ity for some, but brings increased disturbances and deeper gained hostility to
more.
38. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890-91 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
Vol. 1972:347]
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